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Let me ﬁrst illustrate what I think the most important aspect of the so-
called Takenaka plan. By now, many policymakers and academics share a
high praise for the Takenaka plan of October 30, 2002 as the decisive way
of ending the decade-long banking crisis of Japan.1 However, few remem-
ber how its reputation has evolved from being too tough to being too com-
promised, and ﬁnally to producing moral hazard by rescuing shareholders
of a failing bank. Ironically, appearing too tough made the stock prices de-
cline, and failure, nationalization, and bailing out shareholders of the Res-
ona Bank produced a moral hazard rally in May 2003.
Let me explain the evolution brieﬂy. (See Hoshi and Ito [2004] for a re-
view of the Financial Services Agency from 1998 to 2004.) In the spring to
summer of 2002, a hot debate regarding the soundness of the Japanese
banking system took place. Minister Yanagisawa, then in charge of Finan-
cial Services Agency (FSA), maintained the position that banks have am-
ple capital and basically sound. Critics, including Mr. Takenaka, Minister
for State for Economic and Fiscal Policy, argued that much of bank capi-
tal consists of deferred tax assets (DTA) that are based on optimistic proﬁt
streams in the future. Mr. Takenaka won the debate and the FSA Minister
position. When Mr. Takenaka took the position of minister in charge of the
FSA, he planned to use discounted cash ﬂow (DCF) for classiﬁcation of
ﬁrms, to harmonize classiﬁcation of large borrowers among commercial
banks, to assess rigorously the collateral values, and to disallow banks to
count much of DTAs toward Tier 1 capital.
The previous classiﬁcation of performing and nonperforming loans re-
lied on whether interest and principal payments have been made as sched-
uled. However, banks were suspected to have assisted ﬁrms to continue pay
interest by lending more. This was called ever-greening (Peek and Rosen-
gren 2001). This concern prompted Mr. Takenaka to propose DCF.
Because banks have reported heavy losses in 2000 to 2001, they could
carry over losses toward the future for oﬀset. If they would earn proﬁts 
in the future, corporate income taxes would be waived in order to oﬀset
carried-over losses. This tax rebate in the future was declared as deferred
tax assets (DTA). This is part of normal accounting rule for expecting fu-
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1. The so-called Takenaka plan is oﬃcially called “Program for Financial Revival—Re-
vival of the Japanese Economy through Resolving Non-Performing Loans Problems of Ma-
jor Banks” issued on October 30, 2002. The link can be found at http://www.fsa.go.jp/en/
news/2002.html#02oct.ture extra income. What was unusual was that the DTA was allowed to be
counted toward Tier 1 capital in the risk-based capital ratio (Basel capital
adequacy rule). Moreover, the portion of DTA in Tier 1 capital had be-
come more than half for some banks. What if a bank would not earn prof-
its, but just break even? Then the DTA would disappear, thus depressing
the Tier 1 capital instantly. It is not hard capital, but could be a mirage—
many critics argued.
The Takenaka plan of adopting DCF and disallowing DTA would re-
duce greatly the banks’ capital. Then the government would be ready to
nationalize any banks being undercapitalized for the Basel capital ade-
quacy standard. Minister Takenaka was reported to have said that no bank
was too big to fail, which prompted a big decline in the stock prices. The
original version of his plan was attacked by bank executives and the bank
lobby at the Diet. Bank executives argued that the change in the capital ad-
equacy rule on DTA would be like a change of the rule in the middle of a
game: the DTA was introduced to accelerate the write-oﬀ of nonperform-
ing loans without worrying too much about undercapitalization by count-
ing future tax rebates as Tier 1 capital. Minister Takenaka, by proposing
to disallow part of DTA for Tier 1 capital, was portrayed as being naive for
pushing too tough a plan that would make most banks being nationalized.
The stock market reacted negatively to tough talks by Mr. Takanaka
right after his assuming the minister position in September 2002. By the
time of disclosure of the Takenaka plan at the end of October, threatening
words had disappeared. The stock prices, especially those in the banking
sector, declined sharply after the plan was announced and the conﬂict
arose between the Minister and the bank executives. Those who regarded
that a tough action would be good news for the market were disappointed
by the negative reaction of the stock market. The stock prices continued to
decline toward the end of the year. The Nikkei 225 went down from 9,619
yen at the end of August to 9,383 yen one month later, to 8,640 yen two
months later. Although the stock prices rose in November, it sank again in
December, and the Nikkei 225 ended the year at 8,579 yen.
With political opposition being strong, and the stock market being
weak, Minister Takenaka had to retreat a little bit. This compromise, or
truce, was crafted toward the end of 1997, in that the DTA was allowed to
be used as before, but an accounting ﬁrm had to evaluate how realistic it
would be to have a projection of future proﬁts from which DTA would be
derived. Pressure was placed on accounting ﬁrms in that if an accounting
ﬁrm certiﬁes the balance sheet and a bank fails only a few month later, the
accounting ﬁrm has to be held responsible. In classifying ﬁrms into non-
performing and performing categories, the discount cash ﬂow (DCF)
method was proposed for evaluation of true worth (and solvency) of a ﬁrm.
Also, a special examination of banks was introduced to make sure that all
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The stock price continued to decline in the ﬁrst four months of 1998, and
by the end of April, the Nikkei 225 index became 7,831 yen—a 20 percent
decline in eight months.2 In April 1998, the accounting ﬁrm of Resona
Bank refused to allow full DTA that the banks thought to deserve. The ac-
counting ﬁrm argued that the prospect of proﬁt trajectory, which indicated
a sharp rise in proﬁts in the next several years, was unrealistic. On May 17,
Resona Holdings applied for capital injection by the government. Due to
less DTA, Resona Bank became undercapitalized even for a domestic bank
(minimum of 4 percent capital ratio). Resona Bank was nationalized al-
though it was still determined as solvent. The Takenaka plan was indeed
implemented although it took seven months to crystallize into some con-
crete result. Despite nationalization, the shareholders of Resona Bank
were essentially bailed out, keeping their shares at the remaining values of
the bank. The government maintained that the bank was undercapitalized,
but solvent, to that shareholders should have claims to the remaining as-
sets, while the government would take over the bank by obtaining newly is-
sued stocks. Shares were diluted, but the existing shareholders were al-
lowed to continue having rights to assets in the bank.
The stock prices of other banks started to soar at the news of Resona
Bank nationalization, without hurting the current shareholders. The ap-
parent moral hazard at Resona Bank was good news for shareholders of
other large banks—who would surely escape zero valuation even at the na-
tionalization. The stock prices started to rally after the nationalization,
and by the end of May, it rose to 8,425 yen, a 9 percent rise from a month
earlier. The stock prices continue to increase. The Nikkei 225 index rose to
10,560 yen by the end of October.
On November 29, 2003, Ashikaga Bank was determined to have failed
when its accounting ﬁrm denied all of the DTA for the Bank. This time, the
bank was regarded to be insolvent so that shareholders lost their values.
However, this did not stop bank stocks from rising further. Four days ear-
lier, the major banks, except for Resona Bank, reported positive proﬁts for
the half year (ending September 2003). The increasing trend of stock prices
was not aﬀected.
Now let me turn to my comments to the Sakuragawa and Watanabe pa-
per. The stated objective of Sakuragawa and Watanabe is to evaluate mar-
ket reactions to the Takenaka reform. They examined the stock price reac-
tions to ﬁve events: the announcement of the Takenaka plan (October 30,
2002), the announcement of its work schedule (November 28, 2002), the re-
lease of the package of monetary policies (March 25, 2003), the failure of
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2. The bottom of Nikkei 225 was on April 28 at 7,607 yen.Resona Bank (May 17, 2003), and the failure of Ashikaga Bank (November
29, 2003). For each event, the authors examined the stock market return as
a whole, whether returns are similar among other banks, and whether price
changes reﬂect individual banks’ balance sheets or a contagion.
I have several comments on identifying event dates and expected signs
on abnormal returns on each event date. First, the so-called Takenaka plan
was announced on October 30, 2002, as mentioned in the Sakuragawa and
Watanabe paper. However, this was after one month of tough talks by Mr.
Takenaka who assumed the minister position on September 30, 2002. He
had been very vocal about how to force the banks to restructure, which
caused stock prices to decline. The Nikkei 225 index dropped by 7 percent,
from 9,384 yen in September 30, 2002 to 8,756 yen on October 30, 2002. By
taking October 30 as an event day, the analysis misses the earlier tough
talks that were real shocks to the market (and bank executives). In fact,
compared to the speciﬁc threat during the ﬁrst month of Takenaka’s term,
the announced plan was not that tough, but a compromise. The market was
more relieved than shocked. Although the bank stock prices were aﬀected,
the negative abnormal returns on the day of plan announcement were not
large.
Second, the real diﬀerence between the Resona Bank and the Ashikaga
Bank was the diﬀerential treatment of shareholders of the two banks.
Shareholders of the Resona Bank were bailed out, while the shareholders
of the Ashikaga Bank, including those ﬁrms and municipal governments
who subscribed to new share issues by Ashikaga bank, suﬀered sudden to-
tal losses. This diﬀerence is not discussed enough in the paper. The tempo-
rary nationalization of the Resona bank produced a turning point and a
minirally in the stock prices, while the Ashikaga did not. After the Resona
failure, the Nikkei 225 rose by 10 percent in less than three weeks. After the
Ashikaga failure, no such rally took place. This observation put a question
on evaluating only a two-day window. The eﬀect of such a plan may extend
for several days because analyzing the plan may take a week.
Third, expected signs of surviving banks’ stock prices may not be so
straightforward. An event analysis should take only an unexpected part of
the “announcement,” or a surprise, as a variable. This is a standard proce-
dure in the literature dealing with macroeconomic statistical release, where
such an expectation can be measured by consensus forecast. However, for
events described in this paper, it is rather diﬃcult to construct such a sur-
prise. Hence, even a failure of a bank could produce a positive reaction
among surviving banks, except a few, if it is taken as a sign of taking ap-
propriate actions.
Fourth, a new monetary policy package on March 25 is only one of a se-
ries of monetary policy measures in 2003 to 2004 (see Ito and Mishkin
[2006] for details). Why March 25 is singled out is not clear, although it may
be an event, signaling a new policy by a new governor. Bank of Japan had
344 Masaya Sakuragawa and Yoshitsugu Watanabeplayed signiﬁcant role in attempts to stabilize the ﬁnancial system as well
as to prevent deﬂation from becoming a serious deﬂationary spiral. Pro-
viding ample liquidity is one way that would work both to stabilize the ﬁ-
nancial system and to stop deﬂation. This was implemented by increasing
target amounts of the current account balance (held by ﬁnancial institu-
tions) at Bank of Japan in 2003 to 2004. The target amount of current ac-
count balance had become an instrument of monetary policy when the in-
terest rate became zero in the spring of 2001.
The Nikkei 225 stock prices hit the bottom at 7,607 yen on April 28 and
started a recovery. What made that turnaround may be interesting to dis-
cuss (in the future work). Whether new monetary policy contributed to this
more than the Takenaka plan can be debatable.
The paper highlights the importance of the Takenaka plan, but further
investigations in the future would produce a comprehensive assessment of
the role of Minister Takenaka’s role at the bottom of the ﬁnancial crisis in
Japan.
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Comment Randall Morck
This chapter is a useful addition to our knowledge of bank regulation. Its
importance transcends Japan because it is really about how monetary and
ﬁscal authorities should go about providing lender-of-last-resort services.
But its importance also transcends macroeconomics because it is ulti-
mately about how strategic thinking needs to guide economic institutions.
The framework the authors use to develop these issues is Japan’s pro-
longed ﬁnancial malaise around the turn of the twenty-ﬁrst century. Suc-
cessive capital investment, stock market, and real estate bubbles left the
country’s banks severely weakened. These bubbles played out roughly along
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